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Abstract This paper studies the problem of burden sharing in countries that were
forced to introduce severe budget cuts after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008
which had unleashed a financial crisis in many industrialised countries of the Western
world. We do not ask how the burden was actually split in each country examined but
how the burden should have been shared among different income groups of society.
In order to answer this question, a questionnaire-experimental investigation was run
among students from Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Our study
offered the students seven different schemes of taxation amongst which we had speci-
fied a proportional rule and two progressive schemes of differing severity. A key result
within our investigation is the finding that a large majority of students in all countries
involved rarely opted for a proportional rule of burden sharing but picked one of the
two progressive schemes instead. However, there were differences between countries
with respect to the frequencies of these three rules, whereby Greece and Ireland were
polar cases. The other rules received only minor support.
Keywords Burden sharing · Proportional rule · Progressive schemes · Questionnaire
studies
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1 Introduction
During the last decades public debt continually increased in almost all member states
of the European Union with only a few short-lived exceptions. The financial crisis
in 2008, starting with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, dramatically aggravated this
situation. The construction industry, small-scale manufacturing, middle-sized firms
and the export sector were hard hit in many countries which led to a sharp decline
of tax revenues for the public authorities. While several countries from the Northern
“hemisphere” of the EU have been faring relatively well in terms of growth rate
and unemployment ratio, most of the countries in the Southern “hemisphere” have
undergone a phase of negative growth, rising unemployment and, as a reaction to
this, general political discontent. This has led to outbreaks of violence but also to an
atmosphere of disappointment and frustration on the part of those who were and still
are seriously hurt by the economic downturn. The countries most affected started to
take, more or less successfully, measures to cut public spending. At the same time,
higher taxes were introduced in order to prevent that public deficits reach intolerable
heights.
Both the cuts within the welfare system and the increase in taxes were also required
by other members of the currency union as a precondition for financial assistance to
prevent an even more severe financial deterioration. These measures raise a general
issue, namely, who should carry the burden of all this? There are at least two aspects to
consider, a within-country perspective and an outside view held by other members of
the currency union. In this paper, we shall focus on the former perspective, the inner-
country situation. Should all income groups of society in the crisis-ridden countries
contribute to a reduction and consolidation of the public budget? And even if there is
agreement on this question, how should the corresponding shares be determined?
Greece probably is the most prominent example of a programme of austerity that
immediately affected its population via cuts in unemployment benefits, pensions, tax
increases and the cut-back of other financial transfers. These cuts were, however,
carried out at a relatively high level, at least when compared with the levels in various
other countries within the monetary union which were also forced to turn to a policy of
severe cuts. People in Greece and in other South-European countries are stakeholders
whose position is, understandably, tainted by self-interest. One should, however, keep
in mind that the consequences of the various policy measures taken are much more
perceptible to the population in these countries than to citizens in better-off economies
who at this point mainly suffer from interest rates on savings that are close to zero per
cent. The views of the people in the latter countries, of course, matter as well. Many
of them fear that at some point, they will be the ones who, with their own tax money,
have to foot the bill when public debt can no longer be expected to be paid back by the
high-deficit countries. Important as this aspect is in relation to the question of viability
of the Euro currency union, we will not consider it any further. Again, our focus will
be on the problem of burden-sharing in the ailing countries, viz. in Southern Europe
and Ireland.
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Theoretical and empirical studies on economic inequality have been the topic of
several scholars during the last decades (see e.g. Amiel and Cowell 1999; Engelmann
and Strobel 2004; Carlsson et al. 2005). In the social choice literature situations of
allocating burdens are called “claims problems”. This is somewhat different to the
typical scenario of a bargaining problem where agents come together in order to
jointly bring about an outcome which is supposed to be superior to their individual
initial position, the cooperative surplus, and which each of them would not have been
able to achieve just by his or her own productive effort alone.
Most generally a claims problem is completely described by the vector of relevant
claims and the amount of resources to be allocated among claimants. The theoretical
literature aims at identifying well-behaved rules, which determine for every claims
problem a division of the amount available among the individuals (see Thomson 2003
for an overview). Different division schemes proposed in the literature include the
proportional rule, which aims at proportionality of awards and losses, the constrained
equal awards rule (CEA), which distributes the available resource evenly as long as
no individual receives more than what she claims, and the constrained equal losses
rule (CEL), which equalizes losses under the constraint that nobody ends up with a
negative amount. These rules are sometimes called the “three musketeers” (Herrero
and Villar 2001). A fourth classical solution is the Talmud rule proposed by Aumann
and Maschler (1985) which rationalizes allocation situations found in the Talmud. All
these rules, and several more, have been characterized axiomatically (see e.g. Bosmans
and Schokkaert 2009; Thomson 2011, 2013). Since our focus is on loss sharing,
a reference to contributions which explicitly deal with lower bounds is warranted
(Thomson 2013, 2015). Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) introduce a property called
securement which guarantees a minimal share to each person and they use this notion
to characterize the Talmud rule. This property can be considered as a weakening
of the concept of lower bound introduced by Moulin (2002). In this context, one
should also refer to so-called equal-sacrifice rules characterized by Young (1988) and
generalizations of this notion, namely generalized equal-sacrifice rules, introduced by
Chambers and Moreno-Ternero (2016).
With respect to the claims problem in general, three interesting empirical investiga-
tions have recently been published. First, in questionnaire experiments conducted by
Bosmans and Schokkaert (2009), students in Belgium and Germany faced allocation
problems in the context of the division of revenues and the distribution of pensions.
The authors varied both the amount to be divided and the degree of inequality of the
claims vector. Allocations offered in the questionnaire were in accordance with various
different rules known from the literature and, depending on the specific situation, have
been classified by the authors as egalitarian (for example, constrained equal awards),
neutral (e.g. proportionality rule) and anti-egalitarian (e.g. constrained equal losses).
Their results showed strong support for the proportional rule in both contexts. In con-
trast, the constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule received
much less support, while other progressive solutions garnered some attention.
Second, Herrero et al. (2010) used both laboratory experiments and questionnaire
investigations to gain further insights into the acceptance of the three prominent rules
described. In the study four hypothetical situations were presented. Participants had
to imagine a bank going bankrupt. Correspondingly, claimants were shareholders,
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depositors, or non-governmental organizations. In a fourth context the problem was
framed in a neutral way. Again, the proportional rule served as a convincing coordi-
nation device in the lab and was also accepted by a larger majority of questionnaire
respondents. Furthermore, the authors could detect a remarkable sensitivity towards
the context within which the situations were presented to participants.
Third, Gächter and Riedl (2006) also considered the attractiveness of the “three
musketeers” and a simple rule called “equal-awards”. They conducted laboratory
experiments and questionnaire studies. In the experiments participants had to negotiate
with another individual about the division of a given amount of money. The authors
constructed two different decision problems with distinct degrees of inequality with
respect to the claims. In each situation, individuals were assigned to either group of
claims on the basis of their results in a knowledge quiz. The bargaining process was
“free-form”: participants communicated with the help of computers and had to reach
agreement within a given time limit. Without an agreement they received nothing
except their show-up fee. The same decision problem was described in a question-
naire. Participants from different samples had to state which allocation they viewed
as “fair”. Yet another group of subjects faced the same problem but received descrip-
tions of different rules and corresponding outcome in the specific situation. These
participants were asked to rank the rules according to their attractiveness.
Gächter and Riedl report several results. Most importantly for the present study,
they found the proportional solution to be the most attractive in the questionnaire
studies, and this result held irrespective of whether respondents were asked to state
the fair solution or to rank different rules that were described, while negotiation
agreements were closer to the constrained equal awards rule. The authors explain
these disparities by pointing out that the proportional solution is an attractive focal
point without negotiation where the normative aspect comes to the fore, whereas
the symmetric disagreement payoff in the bargaining experiment is zero to each
person. This might have highlighted the attractiveness of more equal solutions. Fur-
thermore, negotiators were forced to find compromise solutions in order to avoid a zero
payoff.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that especially in the experiments by Gächter
and Riedl participants bargained over some additional money, even though it turns
out to be less than expected, while in our problem of burden sharing different income
groups are thought to claim to be exempted from further tax payments. The importance
of this difference was already pointed out in a study by Schokkaert and Overleat (1989)
who conducted questionnaire experiments on the perception of justice in micro-level
production contexts. Based on the observation that respondents reacted differently
towards gains and losses, their results suggest that surplus sharing and cost sharing
models have to be distinguished. Furthermore, the authors argue that acquired rights
are important in the way that subsequently imposed income reductions are perceived
differently compared to immediate losses.
In the following sections, we shall report our findings on burden-sharing in relation
to questionnaire investigations that were run in countries that were particularly hard
hit both economically and financially. It was our expectation that respondents in those
countries would be well acquainted with the economic and social problems surround-
ing them and would therefore take our questionnaire study seriously. The countries
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from which we were able to gather empirical data were Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we shall
explain our questionnaire experiment (“rules” for the proceeding of the experiment and
the full text of our questionnaire are relegated to Appendices A and B, respectively).
In this section, we shall also briefly report findings from pilot studies, the genesis of
our investigation so to speak, that we did at universities in Germany, Italy, and Spain
(corresponding results are summarized in Appendix C). In the third section, we report
the descriptive statistics for all six countries included in the final sample, statistically
verify several hypotheses and present some regression results. In the fourth section
we offer a general discussion of our findings and a few concluding remarks.
2 Methods
2.1 The questionnaire
Our study exhibits several typical characteristics of survey-based experiments in the
realm of empirical social choice, i.e. student participants face hypothetical allocation
problems and have to select from a set of theory-based allocations (see Gaertner and
Schokkaert 2012, especially chapter 2 for a thorough discussion of the method). More
concretely, the respondents were invited to imagine a country whose government is
forced to levy additional taxes on its citizens for the coming years. The reason for this
measure is that the country slipped into a financial crisis which led to a large budget
deficit. It is assumed that there are five income groups of equal size in this country.
Before the crisis began, the average monthly net income per income group was, in
monetary units, 600, 900, 1500, 2400, 3600, so that the aggregate income came up to
9000. The amount of additional revenue that the government now has to raise each
month is 1800. The students were then invited to decide in which way this sum should
be split up among the different income groups. In order to help the students in their
decision, various proposals were offered which specified the income distribution after
the introduction of the additional tax. The respondents were asked to indicate which
of the proposals came closest to their own view. They were also given the chance to
propose their own tax scheme if they were unable to agree to any of the proposals. It
was made clear that for each of the proposals offered, the officially determined minimal
income of the country was lying below the lowest income within each tax scheme.
The students were given room for personal comments and were asked to document
some socio-demographic characteristics at the end of the questionnaire investigation.
The different proposals that were offered in the final questionnaire were based on the
following schemes (see Table 1):
(A) a taxing scheme analogous to the constrained equal losses rule;
(B) a proportional scheme (with a fixed tax rate of 20%);
(C) a scheme of progressive taxation (1);
(D) a scheme of progressive taxation (2);
(E) a scheme analogous to the constrained equal awards rule;
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Table 1 Allocations offered in the final questionnaire
Group Net income before the crisis Net income after the introduction of the additional tax
Proposals
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Own proposal
1 3600 3240 2880 2700 2500 2100 2736 2520
2 2400 2040 1920 1900 1900 2100 1824 1680
3 1500 1140 1200 1250 1350 1500 1140 1500
4 900 540 720 800 860 900 900 900
5 600 240 480 550 590 600 600 600
Sum 9000 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
(F) a scheme that exempted the lowest two income groups and taxed the upper three
groups proportionally;
(G) a scheme that exempted the lowest three income groups and taxed the upper two
groups proportionally.
Note that schemes (C) and (D) both satisfy progressivity and income order preserva-
tion. If yi and yj are taxable incomes of two persons i and j, and Ri and Rj are the taxes
to be paid by i resp. j, then progressivity means that if 0 < yi ≤ yj, Ri/yi ≤ Rj/yj.
Income order preservation means that for each pair i, j, if yi  yj, yi – Ri  yj − Rj.
Both properties together imply inequality reduction (Ju and Moreno-Ternero 2008).
An easy calculation shows that the post-tax income profiles of both schemes Lorenz
dominate the original income profile.
Furthermore, while the first four schemes levy additional taxes on all income groups,
schemes (E), (F), and (G) exempt the lower two, respectively three groups from any
additional contribution. This property relates to the notions of lower bound and secure-
ment exposed in various papers by Moulin, Moreno-Ternero and Villar to which we
referred in the introduction.
2.2 The genesis of our study
The final questionnaire text as well as the set of proposals have been specified on
the basis of pilot studies at universities in Germany, Italy, and Spain. In different
preliminary versions various theory-based proposals were tested for their potential
support. All results are reported in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 in Appendix C. The hurried
reader may safely skip this part but we think that it will help to understand how we
arrived at the final set of questions that we gave to the students.
Our very first questionnaire already contained, among other proposals, schemes
A, B, E, F, and G from Table 1 above (see Table 9). At Halle University, out of
106 respondents, 34.9% picked the proportional rule and 30.2% chose rule F which
may be interpreted as some kind of progressivity though the upper three groups are
taxed proportionally. The other schemes only received minor support. An explicit
progressive scheme, however, was not (yet) offered.
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In a second step, we added a progressive taxation scheme to the already exist-
ing options, and this progressive scheme immediately received strong support from
respondents at universities in Osnabrück, Seville, and Rome. In Osnabrück, where we
had 85 respondents, the progressive rule (scheme C in Table 1 above) garnered 54.1%,
the proportional rule received 14.1% and rule F (i.e. rule G in Table 10) was favoured
by 12.9%, with the other schemes well below the latter percentage. The results in
Seville, where we had 67 respondents, were similar to Osnabrück. The progressive
scheme reached 43.3%, the proportional rule 6.% and rule F from Table 1 16.4% (see
Table 11). Finally, out of the 33 participants in Rome 42.4% opted for the progressive
scheme while rule F from Table 1 gained 21.2% (Table 12).
Nevertheless, several students participating in the pilot studies proposed allocations
which reflected different versions of progressivity so that we then decided to include
two schemes with different degrees of progressivity, namely schemes C and D, to
control for differences in the acceptance of such rules (see again Table 1 above).
Is it possible that rules B, C, and D received more support than the other schemes
because they were placed somewhat in the middle, as one might ask? We do not think
so. First of all, the scheme based on CEA is also “somewhat in the middle” but received
little acclaim in pilot studies but also in the final questionnaire study, while scheme F
garnered considerable support in several of the locations. We did not try to randomize
the order of options. Our array of alternative schemes from left to right is in a certain
sense systematic, namely scheme A, for example, is the worst for the “poorest” and
the best for the “richest”, while rules E to G are best for the lowest two classes. We
intended to facilitate the students’ task which is non-trivial.
Before we turn to the analysis and results of the final study, we should also mention
that we excluded three further questionnaire studies. One was conducted in Patras,
Greece, among 19 philosophy students whose answers were amazingly close to those
of the students in Athens reported in the next section. Then we excluded the findings
among 27 students who study journalism in Madrid (Carlos III). These students “dis-
liked” the proportional rule as much as the students in Athens but had, in contrast
to Athens, a very strong preference for the first of the two progressive schemes. We
decided to exclude these groups for two reasons. One was the relatively low sample
size in each case; the second and more important reason was the fact that the fields of
study of these respondents are very different from economics and business adminis-
tration. In further investigations, it would, of course, be interesting to see how, if at all,
students from different backgrounds differ in their evaluations. Finally, we decided to
exclude very recent findings from Barcelona (Universitat Autònoma). These were done
in May 2015 while all the other studies were run between October and December of
2014. For Barcelona, we have results from first year (n = 52) and third year (n = 33)
students in business administration. Both groups hardly chose the proportional rule.
While the first year students clearly preferred the more progressive scheme to the less
progressive version, the third year students just stated the opposite preference, also
distinctly. This is another aspect within the context of burden sharing worth exploring
in future research.
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2.3 Analysis
We will analyse our final data set in four steps and formulate corresponding hypothe-
ses. First, we look at the descriptive data of the total sample and of each country
separately. The main focus is on the performance of the proportional rule, which, as
mentioned above, received overwhelming support in previous experimental studies.
Furthermore, we are interested in the support for various other schemes that result
from different theoretical conceptions. In order to compare support rates, we calculate
95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapping procedures for the most relevant
allocations. The absence of overlap between confidence intervals compared indicates
that the two corresponding rates are significantly different from each other.
Second, we turn to potential local differences in more detail. Although all countries
involved have been hit by the financial crisis, their citizens may have been affected at
different paces and may have experienced distinctly different consequences. Further-
more, it is well-known from other studies that in general country-specific differences in
attitudes towards redistribution exist (see e.g. Gaertner and Schokkaert 2012, chapter
3). Hence, it is important to investigate such disparities in the light of the present theme,
the financial crises and the issue of burden-sharing. In order to compare response dis-
tributions of answers on allocation proposals between pairs of samples we apply χ2
tests.
Third, each proposal can be characterized by a specific degree of inequality of
the resulting income distribution. Hence, we calculate for all proposals the corre-
sponding Gini coefficient and use it as a dependent variable in an OLS regression
model. Here, the vector of explanatory variables contains place indicators but also
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents including age, gender, income of
the family in which the respondent grew up, expected income in 10 years, and politi-
cal attitude (see again Appendix B for corresponding questions). These characteristics
should help us to control for basic socio-demographic differences. Furthermore, to
analyse factors influencing the choice of the proportional solution as a central research
question of this study, a binary logistic regression model is estimated including again
the explanatory variables just described. Finally, we focus on the three most prominent
schemes in all of our surveys and run a multinomial logistic regression model.
Fourth, to explain differences between answers from different places we consider
two potential reasons and evaluate their explanatory power in two modified OLS
regression models for the Gini coefficients which correspond to the answers of the
respondents. Here we substitute the place indicators mentioned above by alternative
macro variables. On the one hand the current economic performance of each country
may influence answers of respondents. We use the quarterly rate of unemployment as a
proxy for various aspects of the economic situation of a country. Unemployment rates
are constantly reported in the media and may therefore act as an important point of
orientation or reference in the respondents’ minds. On the other hand, the redistributive
effect of the tax system in the participant’s own country could explain answers in the
way that respondents just “confirm” the system in which they live. Miller (1992), for
example argues that studying beliefs about “macro-justice”, i.e. justice across the entire
society, faces the risk that respondents are biased by the current income distribution and
welfare practices of their own society. Hence, to catch at least a glimpse of such effects
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we relate real Gini coefficients before and after taxes by calculating the Musgrave–Thin
index (Musgrave and Thin 1948) which then serves as an alternative macro variable.
However, it has to be pointed out that the results should be considered very cautiously
since more data from more than six countries would be necessary to substantiate the
findings.
For all logistic regression models, we report marginal effects to give an impression
of the strength of the effects observed. In each case, variance inflation factors (vif) are
calculated to evaluate the severity of multicollinearity. A value above 5 would suggest
a problem (Sheskin 2011), but in our case they are always clearly below this threshold.
All analyses have been conducted with the software packages SPSSTM (version 22)
and STATATM (version 12).
2.4 The experiment
The questionnaire experiment was run at seven universities in six different countries
which were hit by the crisis. An overview of the different places, the timing of the
studies and sample sizes is provided in the upper part of Table 2. All surveys were
conducted in undergraduate business administration or economics classes during lec-
ture time. In order to focus on one specific difference between respondents—in our
case the country where they currently live—it is an advantage to focus on individuals
of almost similar age, equivalent education and potentially comparable professional
aims. Additionally, we regard it as essential to control for influences of major polit-
ical or economic events in the Euro-area during our investigation so that we tried to
conduct the studies at similar periods of time at all places.
At the beginning of the experiment students received a general introduction. The
text provided in Appendix A was read out aloud by the corresponding lecturer and
presented on PowerPoint slides. With the help of these instructions we tried to signal
that students should take this experiment seriously and state their “true” choice of
the preferred allocation. Also, we guaranteed that participation was voluntary and
anonymous. Students could cancel their participation in the experiment at any time or
leave some questions unanswered.
After collecting the questionnaires, the completed sheets were sent to us by post. All
questionnaires were recorded and statistically analysed in Germany. Afterwards, all
preliminary results were sent back to each colleague who helped us in this investigation
in order to give students some feedback on their decisions, in particular to enable them
to compare their own response with those from others at their university and with those
of respondents from the other countries involved.
3 Results
At the beginning, we excluded those students who had not completely answered both
the decision problem and the demographic questions. In Table 2 resulting drop-out
rates and reduced sample sizes are stated. Obviously, all those respondents had to
be excluded who rejected to state any allocation proposal, but answered at least one
of the socio-demographic questions or gave us some written comments. This group
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comprised 19 students, i.e. 1.8% of all participants. Next, we also omitted all cases in
which at least one socio-demographic answer was missing. The largest proportion
of exclusions, about 5% of the remaining cases, was inter alia based on missing
answers to the question on students’ political attitudes. However, as these individual
characteristics are crucial for further investigations of local differences, completeness
is important here. Finally, we further excluded 14 students with individual proposals
that did not yield the exact amount needed to be raised by the government in the
hypothetical situation, since these responses would be difficult to interpret.
We extensively checked whether any of these exclusions had an impact on results.
As can be seen from the values stated in Table 2, drop-out rates differ between the
places involved. Thus, χ2 tests were used to compare the distribution of answers on the
different proposals between individuals with some missing demographics and those
with complete answers. In neither case could we detect any significant difference.
Additionally, the questionnaire contained an item regarding changes of political
attitudes in the last 5 years. Obviously several students had problems with this question
and ignored it. Hence, we decided to omit the question from further investigations.
Only about 15% of those respondents, who answered this question, stated that their
political view had changed.
Also from Table 2 it can be seen that there is not much variation among different
places with respect to socio-demographic characteristics. But there are a few excep-
tions. On average students from Seville are almost 3 years younger than those from
Venice. A t-test on mean values confirms that these differences are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. Furthermore, while there is only some variation with respect
to family income, which confirms that respondents may have a similar economic
background, at least on average future income expectations differ. They are lowest in
Athens and Nicosia and highest in Galway. In fact, mean income expectations are sig-
nificantly lower in Athens and Nicosia than at each of the other places. It is likely that
these anticipations reflect the perceived current economic situations in Greece and
Cyprus. However, it is remarkable that with regard to political orientation students
from Athens are more to the left, while their counterparts from Nicosia are more to
the right. Again, this difference is statistically significant.
3.1 Descriptive results
A first look at the answer frequencies presented in Table 3 shows that there is quite
a lot of similarity in relation to all countries. More specifically, only three of the
seven proposals that we had offered garnered wider support. These were the propor-
tional solution (scheme B) and the two progressive taxation schemes (rules C and D),
although within this “trio”, there are major differences to which we come back in the
following paragraphs. There is a stunning similarity among the responses from Madrid
and Seville indicating no significant differences with respect to these two sites from
the same country.
In general, the impression of large similarity is also due to conformity in relation
to schemes A and E to G. All these proposals were favoured by only smaller numbers
of respondents. This assertion also includes the percentage of students who seized the
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opportunity to propose their own solution to the loss-sharing problem. There is one
exception, however, which is worth mentioning. Proposal F which exempts the two
lowest income groups and burdens the remaining layers of society proportionately
received non-negligible support in six of the seven universities, again a feature that
adds to the impression of similarity. In some sense, this proposal can also be considered
as progressive since there is no burden sharing at all for the two lowest groups.
Turning to major dissimilarities between places, our main question concerns the
relationship between the proportional rule and the two progressive taxation schemes.
In our introduction, we mentioned that the proportional rule had won much support in
various other investigations.
Result R1: In all countries involved the proportional rule is less frequently chosen
than the two progressive schemes taken together.
In Table 4 we report again the relative frequencies of the three most often observed
choices, viz. proportional and the two progressive schemes. In order to compare the
different values for each place, we calculated 95% confidence intervals based on boot-
strapping procedures. Hence, the absence of overlap between compared confidence
intervals indicates that the two relative frequencies are significantly different from
each other.
The assertion in R1 holds for the complete sample of seven universities, and it is
also true for each of the universities individually. Even more striking, for the total
sample, but also for respondents in Athens and Lisbon, this statement is true in a
pairwise comparison between the proportional scheme and each of the two progressive
proposals. Additionally, it also holds for Galway and Nicosia in relation to the less
progressive scheme and for Venice with respect to the more progressive rule. It is worth
noticing that the proportional scheme was particularly unpopular at the universities in
Greece and Cyprus. To summarize, the solution in accordance with the proportional
allocation of losses clearly finds less support than the two progressive schemes among
all groups of students included in our sample.
Could it be that the proportional rule was less frequently chosen because it was not
easily recognized as being proportional? We do not believe that this could have been
the case. First of all, the deduction of 20% from the status quo net income can easily
be detected (and calculated) at least for groups 3–5. We find that the two progressive
schemes are much more complex in their structure. The main reason, however, that
the proportional rule did not have an a priori disadvantage against other schemes has
already been given in Sect. 2.2. In our very first pilot study, where, as mentioned, we
offered neither scheme C nor rule D, the proportional rule received by far the strongest
support among all schemes that were offered.
There is a further point to be made in this context. It was on purpose that we did
not tell our students anything about the theoretical concept underlying each of the
seven schemes. To talk about proportionality or progressivity or a rule of equal losses,
for example, might have triggered certain reactions so that a shade of manipulation,
into one direction or another, could, perhaps, have entered the evaluative exercise,
something which should be avoided by all means. We rather thought that students
should compare different distributions of net income after additional taxes had been
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levied and then make their choice. Actually, several of the verbal answers that we
received lean into this direction.
3.2 Country-specific answers
The descriptive results discussed in the previous subsection have already revealed
some country-specific differences. Our next question focuses on the distribution of
the most frequently chosen proposals, namely the proportional rule (B) and the two
progressive schemes (C and D), and tries to differentiate among different sites.
Result R2: The distribution of proposals B, C, and D for Greece (Athens) differs from
the one for the other Southern European countries plus Ireland.
In Table 5 we focus only on those respondents who selected one of these three
schemes. Their share of the corresponding total sample at each location mildly varies
between 68.3% in Venice and 77.9% in Lisbon. Nevertheless, we regard it as important
to exclude any effects resulting from different frequencies of choices apart from the
three schemes which may then dilute the following χ2 tests. The numbers stated in
the table show that result R2 can be confirmed due to two findings: first, respondents
in Athens picked the proportional solution significantly less often than students at the
other universities. Second, respondents in Athens chose the more progressive of the
two progressive schemes considerably more often than students at the other sites and
at the same time picked the less progressive proposal with roughly the same frequency
as students at the other locations.
Table 5 Proportional and progressive taxation schemes (only schemes B, C, and D): comparison of places
Athens Galway Lisbon Madrid Nicosia Seville Venice
Sample size 90 97 218 150 51 31 84
Proportion of total
sample (%)
70.9 75.2 77.9 76.5 71.8 77.5 68.3
(B) Proportional (%) 5.6 24.7 16.1 25.3 11.8 22.6 22.6
(C) Progressive 1 (%) 42.2 46.4 44.0 38.0 54.9 41.9 31.0
(D) Progressive 2 (%) 52.2 28.9 39.9 36.7 33.3 35.5 46.4
χ2 test statistic
Athens – 17.615*** 7.676** 15.737*** 5.286* 8.087** 10.967***
Galway 17.615*** – 5.030* 2.079 3.487 0.486 6.572**
Lisbon 7.676** 5.030* – 4.877* 2.020 0.848 4.649*
Madrid 15.737*** 2.079 4.877* – 5.890* 0.191 2.194
Nicosia 5.286* 3.487 2.020 5.890* – 2.097 7.881**
Seville 8.087** 0.486 0.848 0.191 2.097 – 1.429
Venice 10.967*** 6.572** 4.649* 2.194 7.881** 1.429 –
Levels of significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Each sample only includes answers in accordance with
schemes (B), (C) or (D)
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In addition, we find two similarities between the results from Athens and corre-
sponding findings from other locations noteworthy. On the one hand, support for the
proportional solution is also very low in Nicosia compared to the remaining sites,
where it is strongest in Galway and Madrid. On the other hand, only in Venice the
more progressive scheme also finds much stronger support than the less progressive
solution. At all the other locations, this ordering is reversed. Especially in Galway and
Nicosia, the less progressive scheme is more often chosen than the other two solutions.
Result R3: Athens and Galway are “polar cases” if one restricts the analysis to the
three most popular schemes B, C, and D, whereas findings at the other
sites lie in between.
The χ2 tests also reported in Table 5 confirm the previous observations of the
descriptive results. Here, pairwise comparisons between site-specific allocations of
answers on the proportional and the two progressive schemes are conducted.
The results suggest, indeed, that Athens and Galway can be described as polar cases.
The extreme position of Athens manifests itself most clearly in a direct comparison
with Galway, Madrid, and Venice, respectively. Additionally, and in line with the
descriptive results, the differences between answer distributions in Athens and Nicosia
are statistically significant only at the 10% level (p = 0.071). Galway shows, of
course, a substantial difference to Athens. In a comparison between these two sites,
restricted to the proportional and the two progressive solutions, the p value of the
χ2 tests statistic is below 0.001 and is lowest among all values estimated in binary
comparisons between any two places.
Furthermore, the difference is still significant between Galway and Venice (p =
0.037) or Lisbon (p = 0.081), but there are no significant differences in relation to
the other sites. Furthermore, the significant differences between Venice on the one
hand and Athens and Galway as well as Lisbon (p = 0.098) and Nicosia (p = 0.019)
on the other is mainly due to the polarisation of choices between no progression and
higher progression in Venice. First, a large proportion of respondents in Venice opted
for the proportional solution and this was accompanied by the fact that second, the
more progressive scheme received substantially more support than the less progressive
rule. We will further investigate country-specific differences in the following two
subsections.
3.3 Regression models with place effects
As shown in Table 2, there are, among the sites incorporated in our investigation, some
disparities with respect to several basic socio-demographic characteristics of respon-
dents. Hence, to control for the influence of such attributes and to check the robustness
of the results we estimated three different regression models already described in the
second section. With regard to the place dummy variables, Athens serves as the base
case in all models because the results previously presented indicate that this site is one
polar case compared to the other locations.
First, we use the Gini coefficient as a dependent variable. This has the great advan-
tage that we are able to compare each allocation chosen including individual proposals.
Hence, every single distribution of losses is interpreted with respect to the resulting
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inequality among income groups. A higher coefficient of the OLS regression model
indicates a higher average inequality brought about by the corresponding group of
individuals.
In Table 3 it has already been stated that the mean Gini coefficient in Athens
is considerably lower than the corresponding values at all other sites. The estimated
coefficients for the different places reported in the first column of Table 6 convincingly
confirm this observation while controlling for some socio-demographic differences
between single places. Almost all coefficients are significantly higher than zero at the
1% significance level.
Second, turning to the choices in accordance with the proportional solution, Table
3 reveals again that the probability of observing a corresponding answer is lowest in
Athens and highest at the sites in Spain, with Galway and Venice being close. The
regression results of the binary logit model presented in the second column of Table
6 confirm these observations. The estimated marginal effects for Galway, Madrid
and Venice indicate a higher probability of observing the allocation that reflects a
proportional distribution of losses compared to the sample from Athens.
Third, we focus on the three most prominent schemes, viz. proportional, progressive
1 and progressive 2. Consequently, the total sample size is reduced from 966 to 721
respondents. In order to investigate differences with respect to the relative frequencies
of choosing in accordance with the three rules we estimated the multinomial logistic
regression model stated in the last columns of Table 6. The place effects observed
for the proportional solution are even more pronounced here compared to the binary
logit model due to the sample reduction. Nevertheless, the marginal effects reported
in all three columns also reveal further differences. The higher probability of observ-
ing a choice in accordance with the proportional rule in Venice compared to Athens
leads to a lower probability for the first progressive rule. In some contrast, in Galway
the higher probability for the proportional rule clearly results in less support for the
second progressive scheme. The results from Madrid are less clear-cut. Hence, the
identification of Athens and Galway as polar cases seems to be justified.
Result R4: Politically left-oriented respondents and those who expect a low future
income are more in favour of a redistribution from the rich to the poor.
The individual characteristics incorporated in the regression models reveal some
further effects which, however, mainly confirm basic intuitions. First, older respon-
dents are less likely to choose in accordance with the proportional solution and more
often favour the more progressive scheme. However, since the sample includes only
students there is not much variation with respect to the age of respondents and the
effect is small. Second, individuals who report an orientation toward the political left
support on average a lower Gini coefficient and more often reject the proportional
scheme. This confirms the intuition that left-leaning people more often support redis-
tribution from the rich to the poor. Third, with respect to past family and future own
income we observe in both logistic regression models that individuals, who expect
to earn a lower income in the future, less often support the proportional solution and
more often support the first progressive scheme.
Although the direction of the effect is not surprising and its size is reasonably
high, we expected even some stronger results with respect to own income. Hence, we
123
130 SERIEs (2017) 8:113–144
Ta
bl
e
6
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
m
o
de
ls
w
ith
in
di
v
id
ua
lc
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
sa
n
d
pl
ac
e
ef
fe
ct
s
O
LS
m
o
de
l:
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
G
in
ic
o
ef
fic
ie
nt
×
10
0
B
in
ar
y
lo
gi
tm
o
de
l:
(B
)P
ro
po
rti
on
al
:0
=
n
o
,
1
=
ye
s
M
ul
tin
om
ia
ll
og
ist
ic
m
o
de
l(
res
tri
cte
dt
o
th
re
e
an
sw
er
in
g
ca
te
go
rie
s)
(B
)P
ro
po
rti
on
al
(C
)P
ro
gr
es
siv
e
1
(D
)P
ro
gr
es
siv
e
2
Co
ef
.(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
A
ge
−0
.0
26
−0
.0
15
**
−0
.0
18
*
−0
.0
06
0.
02
4*
*
(0.
03
0)
(0.
00
7)
(0.
01
0)
(0.
01
3)
(0.
01
2)
M
al
e
0.
01
9
−0
.0
11
−0
.0
11
0.
04
9
−0
.0
39
(0.
25
3)
(0.
01
9)
(0.
02
8)
(0.
04
0)
(0.
04
0)
Po
lit
ic
al
o
ri
en
ta
tio
n
M
id
dl
e
(an
sw
er
4)
0.
68
4*
*
0.
03
4
0.
04
9
0.
04
5
−0
.0
94
**
(0.
29
4)
(0.
03
1)
(0.
04
3)
(0.
05
0)
(0.
04
7)
R
ig
ht
(an
sw
ers
5–
7)
1.
21
0*
**
0.
08
7*
**
0.
11
8*
**
0.
05
1*
−0
.1
69
**
*
(0.
30
7)
(0.
03
3)
(0.
04
4)
(0.
05
2)
(0.
04
8)
Fa
m
ily
in
co
m
e
Lo
w
(an
sw
er
s
1–
3)
−0
.5
59
0.
01
4
0.
02
2
−0
.0
58
0.
03
6
(0.
36
4)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
05
1)
(0.
06
4)
(0.
06
6)
M
id
dl
e
(an
sw
er
4)
−0
.3
52
−0
.0
08
−0
.0
09
−0
.0
65
0.
07
4*
(0.
25
2)
(0.
02
1)
(0.
03
0)
(0.
04
1)
(0.
04
1)
Fu
tu
re
in
co
m
e
Lo
w
(an
sw
er
s
1–
3)
−0
.2
00
−0
.0
70
**
*
−0
.0
86
**
0.
14
2*
*
−0
.0
58
(0.
34
9)
(0.
02
4)
(0.
03
6)
(0.
05
7)
(0.
05
5)
M
id
dl
e
(an
sw
er
4)
−0
.0
73
−0
.0
10
−0
.0
09
0.
03
3
−0
.0
25
(0.
27
0)
(0.
02
3)
(0.
03
2)
(0.
04
5)
(0.
04
4)
123
SERIEs (2017) 8:113–144 131
Ta
bl
e
6
co
n
tin
ue
d
O
LS
m
o
de
l:
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
ar
ia
bl
e:
G
in
ic
o
ef
fic
ie
nt
×
10
0
B
in
ar
y
lo
gi
tm
o
de
l:
(B
)P
ro
po
rti
on
al
:0
=
n
o
,
1
=
ye
s
M
ul
tin
om
ia
ll
og
ist
ic
m
o
de
l(
res
tri
cte
dt
o
th
re
e
an
sw
er
in
g
ca
te
go
rie
s)
(B
)P
ro
po
rti
on
al
(C
)P
ro
gr
es
siv
e
1
(D
)P
ro
gr
es
siv
e
2
Co
ef
.(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
dy
/d
x
(S
E)
G
al
w
ay
1.
34
1*
**
0.
19
9*
0.
25
6*
*
−0
.0
14
−0
.2
41
**
*
(0.
43
8)
(0.
10
3)
(0.
12
0)
(0.
09
9)
(0.
06
3)
Li
sb
on
1.
07
4*
**
0.
08
5
0.
10
6
−0
.0
25
−0
.0
80
(0.
38
1)
(0.
06
7)
(0.
08
7)
(0.
07
6)
(0.
07
0)
M
ad
rid
1.
43
2*
**
0.
16
4*
0.
21
4*
*
−0
.1
02
−0
.1
12
(0.
42
5)
(0.
08
6)
(0.
10
5)
(0.
08
1)
(0.
07
4)
N
ic
os
ia
1.
50
1*
**
0.
08
5
0.
09
9
0.
04
9
−0
.1
48
*
(0.
54
4)
(0.
09
5)
(0.
11
8)
(0.
10
3)
(0.
07
8)
Se
v
ill
e
1.
42
2*
*
0.
13
9
0.
18
0
−0
.0
76
−0
.1
04
(0.
70
3)
(0.
12
0)
(0.
14
6)
(0.
11
6)
(0.
10
5)
Ve
n
ic
e
1.
82
0*
**
0.
23
5*
*
0.
32
2*
*
−0
.1
84
**
−0
.1
38
*
(0.
50
4)
(0.
10
8)
(0.
12
6)
(0.
08
2)
(0.
07
9)
Co
ns
ta
nt
28
.2
86
**
*
(0.
78
1)
y
=
Pr
(ch
oic
e)
(pr
ed
ict
)
0.
11
6
0.
16
5
0.
43
5
0.
40
0
Sa
m
pl
e
siz
e
96
6
96
6
72
1
(P
seu
do
)R
2
0.
05
0
0.
06
2
0.
04
7
F
te
st
/W
al
d
te
st
3.
61
**
*
46
.6
2*
**
67
.7
6*
**
(R
ob
u
st
)s
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
A
ll
m
o
de
ls
in
cl
ud
e
a
co
n
st
an
tt
er
m
.F
o
r
du
m
m
y
v
ar
ia
bl
es
dy
/d
x
re
fe
rs
to
a
di
sc
re
te
ch
an
ge
fro
m
0
to
1.
B
as
e
ca
se
:
fe
m
al
e,
po
lit
ic
al
o
rie
nt
at
io
n:
le
ft
(an
sw
er
s
1–
3),
fa
m
ily
in
co
m
e:
hi
gh
(an
sw
er
s
5–
7),
fu
tu
re
in
co
m
e:
hi
gh
(an
sw
ers
5–
7),
A
th
en
s.
Le
v
el
so
fs
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
:*
10
%
,*
*
5%
,*
*
*
1%
123
132 SERIEs (2017) 8:113–144
also tested whether changes in one’s own income, i.e. a higher or lower future income
compared to the past family income, has a more remarkable effect. However, we could
not detect any significant influences.
Thus to summarize the findings of the regression models so far, we can confirm
the main differences between places already observed from the descriptive data. How-
ever, having controlled for some socio-demographic characteristics we can show that
our results are robust with respect to differences between samples regarding these
individual attributes.
3.4 Two macro indicators as potential explanations for place differences
It is not utterly straightforward to explain especially the large difference between the
results from Ireland and Greece described in Sect. 3.2. One could, of course, argue
in terms of the current economic performance of the two countries which leads to
optimism in one case and serious doubts in the other. As far as our own questionnaire
data set is concerned, we finally consider two indicators of different sorts as potential
explanations for country differences more generally.
Result R5: The unemployment rate has some explanatory power for the Gini coefficient
resulting from the answers of respondents, while this is not the case for the
Musgrave–Thin index.
The first explanation refers to the rates of unemployment for the quarters in 2014 (see
Table 7). For Greece, the quarterly, seasonally adjusted figures are 27.1, 27.0, 26.2,
and 25.9, for Ireland the figures are 12.2, 11.6, 11.1, and 10.4.
What is remarkable is that for Spain, the unemployment figures look very bad as
well. As a matter of fact, these are almost similar to those in Greece. In contrast to
Greece, however, the figures for family income 10 years ago and for the own expected
income in 10 years’ time are for our respondents in Madrid 4.53 and 4.54 and for
Seville 4.88 and 4.80. This subjective view is quite different from the judgment of the
students in Athens (see again Table 2).
To control for such different aspects simultaneously we reconsidered the OLS
regressions reported in Sect. 3.3, which allows for ordering all answers given by
the students, but substitute the place dummies by the unemployment rates of each
country determined directly before the questionnaire study, viz. in the third quarter of
2014. The resulting model is contained in the first column of Table 8.
The estimated coefficient for the rate of unemployment is negative and significant at
the 5% level. Hence, a higher unemployment rate corresponds to a lower average Gini
coefficient stated in the questionnaire by our respondents. This result is robust with
respect to several quarters of 2014; the results are very similar if data from the second
or fourth quarter of 2014 are used. Hence, for the entire sample, country-specific
unemployment rates have predictive power for the desired distribution of burdens
observed in the questionnaire.
The second potential explanation we consider for the place differences refers to
the real tax progression. In Sect. 2.3, we have already explained that the answers of
the students in the sample may reflect or confirm the existing progressivity of the tax
system of their country. In the last columns of Table 7, we present relevant data from
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Table 8 Regression models
with individual characteristics
and macro effects
Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Base case: female,
political orientation: left
(answers 1–3), family income:
high (answers 5–7), future
income: high (answers 5–7).
Sample sizes differ because the
Musgrave–Thin after taxes is not
available for Cyprus. Levels of
significance: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%
OLS models: dependent variable:
Gini coefficient × 100
Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)
Age −0.036 −0.019
(0.030) (0.032)
Male 0.079 0.283
(0.251) (0.256)
Political orientation
Middle (answer 4) 0.730** 0.911***
(0.291) (0.298)
Right (answers 5–7) 1.341*** 1.346***
(0.304) (0.309)
Family income
Low (answers 1–3) −0.502 −0.330
(0.356) (0.378)
Middle (answer 4) −0.337 −0.386
(0.256) (0.260)
Future income
Low (answers 1–3) −0.271 −0.547
(0.338) (0.376)
Middle (answer 4) −0.056 −0.126
(0.264) (0.270)
Unemployment rate
2014/Q3
−0.041**
(0.021)
Musgrave–Thin index
after taxes
0.044
(4.937)
Constant 30.282*** 29.080***
(0.716) (5.432)
Sample size 966 895
(Pseudo) R2 0.034 0.036
F test 3.97*** 3.89***
the OECD database for 2013, the last year for which all necessary values are currently
available. Unlike other official sources, the OECD data differentiates between taxes
and transfers, but unfortunately values for Cyprus are not contained. For each country
we compare Gini coefficients before and after taxes and calculate the Musgrave–Thin
index (Musgrave and Thin 1948). The index is higher if there is more redistribution
due to taxes.
Following the hypothesis that respondents refer to the progressivity of the existing
tax system, the Greek students would choose a less progressive rule than the Irish
students according to the numbers in Table 7. This, however, is not in conformity with
our results. The opposite is the case (see again the mean values for the Gini coefficients
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in Table 3). Furthermore, for the entire sample, the impact of the Musgrave–Thin index
on the Gini coefficients resulting from the answers of our respondents is not clear as
can be seen from the results reported in the last column of Table 8. The estimated
coefficient is close to zero.
To summarize while the unemployment rate seems to explain some place differences
observed, we could not find any significant relation between the real progressivity of the
tax systems and the Gini coefficients corresponding to the answers in the questionnaire.
4 Discussion and concluding remarks
Background of this study is the present economic and financial situation of major
countries in Southern Europe and Ireland which were hit after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in 2008. These countries as well as others had been forced to take severe
measures in order to reduce their budgetary deficits as well as the amount of govern-
ment debt that had already been substantial before the crisis and then further increased.
The intriguing question for us was not to get information on how the burden was or
is actually shared among the different layers of society in each of these countries but
to find out how citizens felt that the burden should have been split up. In order to do
this, we presented a hypothetical but hopefully not too unrealistic situation to students
in economics and business administration courses and invited them to choose among
different schemes of burden sharing or propose their own solution.
To be quite clear, the purpose of our study was not to compare countries that
were hard hit with countries such as Germany which were affected to a minor degree
only. Our question was twofold: (a) how would the proportional rule fare in all those
countries that suffered significantly from the financial crisis which was unleashed in
2008, knowing that the proportional scheme did surprisingly well in investigations
that had a different background; and (b) would the fact that some of these countries
were more successful, whereas others were less successful in managing the crisis have
an impact on the general attitude of how the burden should be or should have been
shared?
In our instructions, we were relatively vague in relation to the question what the
additional taxes should be used for, except that we spoke of “a large budget deficit”.
We did this on purpose. First of all, the students we contacted probably knew the
economic and social situation within their own country so that they had at least a
rough idea about what the levy of extra taxes would serve for. Secondly, and perhaps
more important within a questionnaire study, any more concrete specification about
where the additional taxes would go to might have led to particular reactions which,
perhaps, should be avoided. If we had, for example, mentioned that the World Bank or
the EU stood behind this measure, we would have elicited reactions which would have
been different from the ones we would have engendered if we had said that the extra
money went to the poor or again quite differently, if we had said that the additional
tax revenues were needed to remedy grave mistakes from past governments.
Without restating our main results, two findings are of particular importance. First,
the overwhelming majority of the undergraduates who participated in our study opted
for a progressive and not for a proportional scheme of burden sharing. Did they just
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“confirm” or support the tax system in their own country to which they are accustomed
as Miller (1992) has suggested? In our case, all countries involved are characterised
by progressive income taxation systems. Hence Miller’s scepticism or suspicion may
be justified, given that students have exact or at least approximate knowledge about
the degree of progressivity of their tax system, so that their answers will reflect or
confirm the existing scheme. However, at least from our data we could not confirm
this hypothesis. One could even come to a different inference. Our findings of a
preference for a more progressive tax scheme in Greece are the expression of larger
dissatisfaction with the present share of the burden expressed by the Gini coefficient
and with the current degree of redistribution reflected by the Musgrave–Thin index
in this country. Remember that questionnaire results do not predict or express actual
behaviour but are a reflection of what would be desirable from the viewpoint of the
person invited to respond (Gaertner and Schokkaert 2012, Chapter 2). Following this
line, the opposite could be inferred with respect to Ireland. The Irish students’ choice
of the less progressive scheme may be an expression of their desire to have a smaller
degree of redistribution than the current one. Let us repeat that all these inferences
are made under the hypothesis that the undergraduates in our study are well informed
about the actual tax schedule in their country and its effect on societal redistribution,
an assumption which may not hold in every case.
However, admittedly, for the results that we reported, there may be other explana-
tions as well but our data do not provide any additional clues. In future studies a more
detailed questionnaire at the very end of the students’ responses may, perhaps, provide
a clearer picture. However, too many questions referring to personal characteristics
and attitudes could well increase the number of cases where respondents might refuse
to give an answer. One has to be very cautious on this matter.
As pointed out in the introduction, the proportional rule was the dominating scheme
in several investigations that “come close” to our scenario, namely situations of bequest
and bankruptcy where claims had been made that could not be satisfied. Our study
has shown that the proportional rule clearly runs behind the two progressive schemes
that we had offered for choice. Hence, at least on the macro level namely in the
context of burden sharing called for by a severe financial crisis, progressive rather
than proportional schemes are supported by the majority of students. In turn, this
empirical observation can be used to refine tax schemes currently proposed in the
literature.
The second finding of our study is, and this might have been expected, that Greece
(Athens) and Ireland (Galway) are polar cases when it comes to a choice among the
proportional rule and two variants of a progressive scheme. We should add that at least
according to our study, students in Venice are close to those in Athens in relation to
a preference for the second progressive scheme over the first, whereas they are closer
to their counterparts from Galway in terms of support for the proportional solution.
These observations may come as a surprise.
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Appendix
Appendix A: “Rules” for questionnaire experiments on burden sharing
Preliminary announcements (to be read out loud to the students before distributing the
sheets)
– We kindly ask you to participate in this questionnaire experiment.
– It is part of a larger project dealing with the issue of burden sharing, run in various
European countries.
– There may be a weak link to the topics of your current lecture or class, but not
necessarily.
– The questionnaire contains one single decision problem, a field for comments you
might like to add, and some socio-demographic questions.
– Note that there is no right or wrong answer for the decision problem.
– Instead, we are interested in your personal view on the problem described.
– Participation in this study is completely voluntary, but we would be happy to
receive your personal contribution.
– All of your answers will be strictly kept anonymous.
– 10–15 min should be more than enough to answer our questionnaire.
– We kindly ask you now to stop any conversation.
– Please focus only on your own sheet.
– If there are any questions, do not ask your neighbours but complete the question-
naire as far as possible
Comment to the lecturer: the last three points intend to create an “exam atmosphere”.
The sheets can now be distributed.
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Appendix B: The Questionnaire
Consider the following study. Please remark that there is no right or wrong answer.
We are exclusively interested in your opinion on the given problem.
Consider a country whose government is forced to levy additional taxes on its
citizens for the coming years. The reason for this measure is that this country slipped
into a financial crisis which led to a large budget deficit. In the country we consider,
one can distinguish between five income groups of equal size. Before the financial
crisis began, the average monthly income after tax per income group was as follows:
(3600; 2400; 1500; 900; 600)
The amount that the government has to raise each month comes up to 1800 units. How
should this sum be split up among the different income groups?
In order to help you answer this question, various proposals are being offered which
specify the income distribution after the introduction of the additional tax. Please
indicate which of the proposals comes closest to your own view. In case you disagree
with all proposals that are being made, you may specify your own tax scheme.
It is assumed that for each of the proposals made, the officially determined minimal
income of the country always lies below the lowest income within each tax scheme.
Group 
Net  
income 
before the 
crisis 
Net income after the introduction of the additional tax: 
Proposals 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
Own pro-
posal 
1 3,600 3,240 2,880 2,700 2,500 2,100 2,736 2,520  
2 2,400 2,040 1,920 1,900 1,900 2,100 1,824 1,680  
3 1,500 1,140 1,200 1,250 1,350 1,500 1,140 1,500  
4 900 540 720 800 860 900 900 900  
5 600 240 480 550 590 600 600 600  
Sum 9,000 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200  
Your choice 
(please tick) O O O O O O O 
 
(Please also answer the back side) 
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Appendix B: The questionnaire (continued)
Room for potential comments:
Finally we ask you for some personal information. Please keep in mind that the
questionnaire is anonymous and your answers are only used for scientific purposes.
1. Gender: O female O male
2. Age: ________  years
3. How would you rate your family’s income ten years ago?
very very
poor rich
O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O
4. How would you rate your own income prospects in ten years?
very very
low high
O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O
5. How would you rate your political view?
left right
O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O —— O
6. Did you change this political view within the last five years? O yes O no
If “yes”, please state “why”.
Thanks for your participation.
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Appendix C: Pilot studies
Table 9 Pilot study at Martin Luther University in Halle/Germany (May 2013)
Group Net income before
the crisis
Net income after the introduction of the additional tax
Proposals
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) Own proposal
1 3600 3240 2880 2100 3000 2700 2736 2520
2 2400 2040 1920 2100 1800 1500 1824 1680
3 1500 1140 1200 1500 900 1500 1140 1500
4 900 540 720 900 900 900 900 900
5 600 240 480 600 600 600 600 600
Sum 9000 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
Your choice (please tick) O O O O O O O
Answer frequencies (N = 106) 3.8% 34.9% 6.6% 6.6% 0.9% 30.2% 3.8% 13.2%
Proposals are based on the following schemes: [place of the scheme in the final
questionnaire]
(A) Constrained equal losses rule [A].
(B) Proportional scheme [B].
(C) Constrained equal awards rule [E].
(D) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups evenly [–].
(E) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups evenly [–].
(F) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups proportionally
[F].
(G) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups proportionally
[G] (Table 9).
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Table 10 Pilot study at the University of Osnabrück/Germany (October 2013)
Group Net income before
the crisis
Net income after the introduction of the additional tax
Proposals
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) Own proposal
1 3600 3240 2880 2700 2100 3000 2700 2736 2520
2 2400 2040 1920 1900 2100 1800 1500 1824 1680
3 1500 1140 1200 1250 1500 900 1500 1140 1500
4 900 540 720 800 900 900 900 900 900
5 600 240 480 550 600 600 600 600 600
Sum 9000 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
Your choice (please tick) O O O O O O O O O
Answer frequencies (N = 85) 1.2% 14.1% 54.1% 5.9% 4.7% 1.2% 12.9% 1.2% 4.7%
Proposals are based on the following schemes: [place of the scheme in the final
questionnaire]
(A) Constrained equal losses rule [A].
(B) Proportional scheme [B].
(C) Progressive scheme [C].
(D) Constrained equal awards rule [E].
(E) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups evenly [–].
(F) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups evenly [–].
(G) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups proportionally
[F].
(H) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups proportionally
[G] (Table 10).
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Table 11 Pilot study at the Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville/Spain (January 2014)
Group Net income before
the crisis
Net income after the introduction of the additional tax
Proposals
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) Own proposal
1 3600 3240 2880 2700 2100 3000 2700 2736 2520
2 2400 2040 1920 1900 2100 1800 1500 1824 1680
3 1500 1140 1200 1250 1500 900 1500 1140 1500
4 900 540 720 800 900 900 900 900 900
5 600 240 480 550 600 600 600 600 600
Sum 9000 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
Your choice (please tick) O O O O O O O O O
Answer frequencies (N = 67) 3.0% 6.0% 43.3% 6.0% 10.4% 9.0% 16.4% 6.0% 0.0%
Proposals are based on the following schemes: [place of the scheme in the final
questionnaire]
(A) Constrained equal losses rule [A].
(B) Proportional scheme [B].
(C) Progressive scheme [C].
(D) Constrained equal awards rule [E].
(E) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups evenly [–].
(F) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups evenly [–].
(G) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups proportionally
[F].
(H) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups proportionally
[G] (Table 11).
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Table 12 Pilot study at Sapienza University of Rome/Italy (October 2013)
Group Net income before
the crisis
Net income after the introduction of the additional tax
Proposals
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) Own proposal
1 3600 3240 2880 2700 2100 3000 2700 2736 2520
2 2400 2040 1920 1900 2100 1800 1500 1824 1680
3 1500 1140 1200 1200 1500 900 1500 1140 1500
4 900 540 720 720 900 900 900 900 900
5 600 240 480 480 600 600 600 600 600
Sum 9000 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200 7200
Your choice (please tick) O O O O O O O O O
Answer frequencies (N = 33) 0.0% 12.1% 42.4% 3.0% 3.0% 0.0% 21.2% 6.1% 12.1%
Proposals are based on the following schemes: [place of the scheme in the final
questionnaire]
(A) Constrained equal losses rule [A].
(B) Proportional scheme [B].
(C) Progressive scheme [C].
(D) Constrained equal awards rule [E].
(E) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups evenly [–].
(F) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups evenly [–].
(G) Exempt the lowest two income groups, tax the upper three groups proportionally
[F].
(H) Exempt the lowest three income groups, tax the upper two groups proportionally
[G] (Table 12).
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